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DAYDREAM BELIEVING:
VISIONARY FORMALISM AND
THE CONSTITUTION
Allan C. Hutchinson* and Andrew Petter**
The failure of traditionalstrands of legal
formalism to provide a satisfactory account of law's relation to material conditions, and its distinction from political
practice, has given rise to a new variant
of formalist theory: visionary formalism.
In this essay, the authors examine visionary formalism through the work of one of
its leading exponents, William E. Conklin.
They contend that,far from rescuing legal
formalism, the visionary account of constitutional adjudication put forward in
Conklin's recent treatise, Images of the
Constitution, exposes formalism for what
it is: an effort to romanticize and legitimize a peculiarly regressive mode of political practice.In the final sections of the
essay, the authors provide their own account of the connections among law, politics and material conditions. They conclude that only a "constitutivelegal theory",
embracing a critical understanding of the
political nature and historicalcontingency
of legal structures, offers any real hope
of harnessing law as a progressive social
instrument.

Linsucces des courants traditionnels du
formalisme juridique 6 expliquer de fagon
satisfaisanteles rapportsdu droit avec les
conditions matdfrielles et ses distinctions
avec la pratique politique a donng naissance 6 une nouvelle variante de la thgorie formaliste: le formalisme visionnaire.
Dans cet essai, les auteurs examinent le
formalisme visionnaire en analysant le
travail d'un de ses principaux reprdsentants, William E. Conklin. Ils maintiennent que, loin de sauver le formalisme
juridique, l'explication visionnairedes dJcisions constitutionnelles des tribunaux
avancge dans le rdcent traitg de Conklin,
Images of the Constitution, r~vle ce que
le formalisme est veritablement: une dJmarche visant d romantiser et lhgitimer
un mode de pratique politique particulirement rdtrograde.A la fin de leur essai,
les auteurs donnent leur propre explication des rapports entre le droit, la politique et les conditions materielles. Ils
concluent que seulement une < thoorie
constitutive du droit >;', comprenant une

vision critique de la nature politique et de
la contingence historique des structures
juridiques, permet d'espirer que le droit
soit utilisg comme instrument de progres
social.

* Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria.
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INTRODUCTION

While most disciplines experience occasional lapses of professional confidence, law seems to exist in a permanent state of identitycrisis. Much of legal scholarship's energy and motivation is drawn
from a desire to answer the central question of modem social theory
- the question of how social structures and values relate to the
material conditions of life. Without some plausible explanation of this
relation, the validity of social knowledge is suspect and the status of
social theorizing remains deeply problematic.
The challenge facing contemporary scholars has been to provide
an account of changing social structures and values - from the rise
of the welfare state to the enactment of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, - that gives sufficient recognition to their
relation to underlying material conditions but does not reduce them to
mere epiphenomenal effects of those conditions. Thus scholars have
sought to provide answers that, on the one hand, avoid totalistic, static
or overly instrumental accounts of social life but on the other hand,
recognize that social structures and values cannot be divorced from
their historical context and material setting.
As a branch of social theory, jurisprudence is obliged to share in
that explanatory task and to run similar risks. Although often less selfconscious in their reflections, legal scholars have grappled with this
intellectual challenge in their continuing debates over the intelligibility
and integrity of the "Rule of Law". 2 Yet mainstream legal scholarship
bears an additional burden - the task of distinguishing law from other
social structures. In order to preserve the legal system's authority and
legitimacy, traditional theorists must provide an explanation of social
theory that not only addresses the relation between social phenomena
and material existence, but that maintains law's autonomy from other
social institutions. Can we know the judgment from the judge? Is law
more than a reflection of patriarchal or capitalist social relations? Does
the legal system serve to frustrate or merely to legitimize abuses of
political power? In short, the central mission of conventional jurisprudence has been to provide a convincing account of the relation between
legal doctrine and socio-economic conditions that, at the same time,
preserves a distinction between law and politics. Without such a
distinction, law and lawyers must abandon their claims to be the

I Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 being Schedule B of the Canada Act
1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
2 Both left and right have sought to appropriate its powerful rhetorical appeal
for their own political campaigns. See, e.g., E Hayek, LAW, LEGISLATION AND
LIBERTY (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976); E.P. Thompson, WHIGS
AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977).
See generally A.C. Hutchinson & P Monahan, THE RULE OF LAw: IDEAL OR
IDEOLOGY

(Toronto: Carswell, 1987).
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privileged and prestigious guardians of collective power: they will
become only its naked purveyors.
This claim that law is a distinct social form that operates independently of politics is the essence of legal formalism. Although it
has suffered a number of deaths, formalism has proved to have more
lives than the proverbial cat. While most mainstream legal scholars
are now prepared to concede that law arises in and affects its social
context, they continue to insist that law can be studied and understood
apart from that constitutive context. Unlike political, sociological or
historical methods of inquiry, legal formalism is an intellectual attitude
and analytical technique that purports to provide a coherent, determinate and neutral account of law as a particular dimension of human
behaviour. 3 Unsullied by ideological impurities, it demands institutional
allegiance and universal obedience solely by dint of its inherent rationality and intellectual cogency. Formalism's informing characteristics
are most obvious in the study of adjudication and legal reasoning the attempt to identify a mode of decision-making that stands in
contrast to ideological debate and that offers a means for resolving
disputes based on enduring principles of justice rather than ephemeral
sources of political predilections. Thus formalists continue to believe
that they can provide an account of law without having to take a stance
on the major and controversial questions of what is the best way to
live collectively and individually. Insisting that the form of social life
can be separated from its substance, they maintain that the lasting
demands of intellectual integrity can be satisfied without regard to the
shifting dynamics of social experience.
Our purpose in this essay is to challenge this prevailing orthodoxy.
We will argue that the continuing efforts of traditional legal scholars
to rescue formalism are as futile as they are fanciful. No matter how
modem and sophisticated its accoutrements, no theory (or its scholarly
production) exists apart from prevailing social and political practice.
The pertinence and value of any legal theory is a function of its
interplay with the irrepressibly contingent context of social life whose
unfolding it can neither fully predict nor entirely control: the contingent
pressures of politics subvert the objectivist pretensions of formalism.
As a consequence, the achievement of a just social order cannot be
accomplished through a rigorous deployment of perennial legal techniques and immutable structures. Rather it depends upon an appreciation of and sensitivity to the changing circumstances of political power
in particular societies.
Our particular focus in this essay is upon the emerging strand of
"visionary formalism". In Part One, we situate this recent theoretical

3 See, e.g., P.W. Hogg, CONSnTUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, 2d ed. (Toronto:
Carswell, 1985); B. Slattery, A Theory of the Charter(1987) 25 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
701.
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innovation in its broader jurisprudential context, with particular regard
to constitutional law and theorizing. This is followed in Part Two by
a description of the work of William Conklin, a leading exponent of
this approach to legal enlightenment. 4 Parts Three and Four provide a
critique of and response to Conklin's theoretical exposition. In Part
Five, we adumbrate our own view of the relation between law and
politics. By way of conclusion, we reach some tentative conclusions
on the preferred focus of further jurisprudential study.

I
According to conventional wisdom, constitutionalism is the "technique of establishing and maintaining effective restraints on political
and government action". 5 Yet this is a limited and limiting understanding of a much broader and richer concept. A constitution is a forum
for determining the kind of society and individuals that we are and
wish to become. It embraces the dynamic efforts of people to negotiate
and establish the institutional and substantive terms of their collective
existence; the process, the product and their dialectical relation are all
within its conceptual provenance. It is not a one-time event nor a
purely practical act of political will. It is an enduring moment and
continuing occasion through which societies, sometimes as much by
default as design, constitute themselves and define the temporary
circumstances and transitory possibilities of their existence. While the
formal documents and conventions of nationhood represent a privileged
resolution of constitutional debate, each attempt to interpret and reinterpret that compromise gives fresh meaning and effect to it. At the
same time, the efforts of workers and the poor to achieve better social
programs and a fairer distribution of wealth should also be counted as
constitutional expressions. Thus constitutionalism embraces the practical and the utopian, the institutional and the ideological, the real and
the imagined, the past and the future.
A constitution is a power map that charts the distribution and
diffusion of political authority in society. 6 Within such an understanding, the role of traditional scholars has been to work as official
4

See also D.M. Beatty,

TALKING HEADS AND THE SUPREMES: THE CANADIAN

PRODUCTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW (Toronto: Carswell, 1990).
5 C.J. Friedrich, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS: NATURE AND

DEVELOPMENT (New York: Harper & Bros, 1937). Although Friedrich takes a broader
approach than many, his work exemplifies a traditional understanding of constitutionalism. For other leading works in this genre, see C. McIlwain, CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND THE CHANGING WORLD (London: Cambridge University Press, 1939); M.J.C.
Vile, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1967); C.J. Friedrich, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1950) at 121.
6 See I.D. Duchacek, POWER MAPS: COMPARATIVE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONS (Santa Barbara: Clio Press, 1973) at 3.
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cartographers. Operating in that precarious terrain between rhetoric and
reality, they map the evolving contours of political authority and record
its historical progress. Because of their belief in legal formalism, much
of their work has been preoccupied with providing an account and
justification of the function performed by lawyers and judicial elites.
Thus jurists have continued to search for a grand theory that would
help to explain the licence, limits and legitimacy of constitutional
interpretation and judicial review. As futile as this quest may be, the
zeal with which it has been pursued emphasizes its centrality to
prevailing constitutional paradigms.
Having long ago abandoned the discredited and transparent values
of rule-formalism, constitutional scholars turned to purposive reasoning
and policy analysis as a means of maintaining their formalist faith.
Recognizing that any serious account of constitutional development
had to take account of larger questions of social justice, mainstream
jurists began to look upon legal doctrine as reflecting an underlying
political rationality or scheme of social justice that rendered constitutional interpretation and judicial review coherent and legitimate. By
adhering to this ideal, judges and jurists could avoid engaging in openended exchanges of ideological debate and retain their vaunted democratic independence.
Recently, however, there has been a growing consensus that
policy-formalism has been unable to withstand the sustained attentions
of the anti-formalist critics. Traditional scholars extricated themselves
from the false security of black-letter rules only to fall victim to the
deceptive allure of black-letter theory. The change was one of location
rather than of mind. Although they looked beyond the limiting horizons
of law and explored the ample attractions of other disciplines, such as
moral philosophy and economics, they never disabused themselves of
the worth of formalism as an intellectual project and political aspiration. Their ambition was to colonize and exploit these extra-legal
outposts for the greater imperial benefit of formalism. As such, jurists
resorted to "policy" as a means of securing the crumbling foundations
of the traditional legal edifice, not as an opportunity for escaping its
undesirable confines.
Undaunted by the demise of policy-formalism as a site of intellectual refuge, traditional scholars have again shifted ground, this time
to the loftier plane of constitutional "visions". While their passion for
purposive reasoning and policy analysis has been quelled, their fixation
with formalism is unflagging. Of course, it cannot be denied that social
visions play an essential role in the development and understanding of
constitutional norms. Behind every constitution lies a set of social
visions that give it life and meaning. Whether involved in its design
or interpretation, all constitutional actors must possess a framework of
ideas that helps them to grasp the past tradition of political ordering,
the nature of present reality, the possibilities for future action, and the
justifications for these understandings. Constitutional visions structure
perception and prescription. They inhabit the twilight zone between
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pure normative abstractions and historically verifiable assertions. Although largely mythic in source and simplicity, they influence the
ordering of reality and become part of people's lived experience and
self-understanding. By mediating the actual and the ideal, such visions
simultaneously empower and limit the political imagination. In this
way, they not only carry strong explanatory force, they also wield
significant moral authority. While they resonate with utopian echoes,
they are meant to convey a sense of the attainable and the realistic in
historical experience.
Without generative visions, legal reasoning would be reduced to
a desultory game of catch-as-catch-can; law's normative dimension
would be lost. Yet as a means of prescribing constitutional interpretation or justifying judicial review, visionary formalism is as ill-fated as
its rule-bound and policy-oriented predecessors. Indeed this latest
switch of formalist allegiance discloses more than it conceals. The
unrealizability of formalism as a theoretical or practical program is
now exposed for all but those too blinded by their formalist fervour
to see. Formalist fidelity has been purchased at the cost of political
transparency.
There are at least two major directions of the critical rejection of
the formalist legacy. First, the shift to visionary formalism has provided
further evidence of the intellectual credulity possessed by formalists of
all stripes. Robustly skeptical about the relation between constitutional
posturing and political reality in other cultures, formalists exhibit an
almost wide-eyed naivety about their congruence in domestic situations.
For instance, North American constitutional scholars are quick to scoff
at Paraguayan assertions that "the exploitation of man by man is
proscribed" or Chinese claims that "citizens enjoy freedom of speech
and assembly". When championing their own constitutions, however,
the existential gap between constitutional aspiration and lived reality
is readily ignored. In the United States, Japanese internment,
McCarthyism and union-bashing are commonly overlooked in the
encomiums to the First Amendment. In Canada, scholars regularly
trumpet the Constitution's commitment to equality without ever feeling
obliged to mention the gross disparities in wealth, income and power
that characterize our social existence or the continuing reduction of
First Nations to Third World status.
Secondly, visionary formalism is even less successful than rule
formalism and policy formalism at concealing its political persuasions.
Scholars of a visionary formalist bent have difficulty denying that the
affirmation of a particular vision amounts to the acceptance of a basic
epistemology, social theory and political agenda, along with a whole
host of foundational premises, insights and intuitions about the human
condition and its potentialities.7 Thus the resort to constitutional visions
7 For a good account of the relation between legal doctrine and social vision,
see H. Steiner, MORAL ARGUMENT AND SOCIAL VISION IN THE COURTS: A STUDY
OF TORT ACCIDENT LAW (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987).
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is not so much an attempt to escape from politics as it is an effort to
romanticize and exalt a particular form of political insight. This serves
to legitimize the activities of academics and judges whose work can
be identified with that form. Moreover, the form, while conceded to
be political in nature, is represented as operating independently of
ordinary ideological conflict. Visionary formalists gain their rhetorical
force and constitutional authority by disclaiming their partisanship on
contested matters of national politics, even as they claim their authority
to make decisive interventions into those matters. Neutrality and impartiality are a function, and not a renunciation, of ideological context.
II
Rather than offer a critique of visionary formalism as an emerging
tendency in modem Canadian jurisprudence, we intend to concentrate
on the work of one of its leading exponents. We would prefer to run
the risk of mistaking the species for the genus than to be accused of
attacking a strawperson. William E. Conklin's recent book, IMAGES
OF A CONSTITUTION, s provides a deserving focus of critical attention.
His writing is erudite and rigorous. Indeed, the strongest part of his
scholarship is his exposure of the shortcomings of rule- and policyformalism. However, despite strenuous and inventive attempts to do
so, he is unable to avoid the force and sweep of his own critical
arguments. His proposed alternative of visionary formalism is open to
the same debilitating criticisms that he uses against these earlier
formalist incarnations: he manages to highlight the inevitable failings
of formalism in the process of crafting its most sophisticated expression.
The book seeks to describe the constitutional images held by
Canada's judicial and academic elites. According to Conklin, these
images are important not because of what they tell us about the
constitution or those judicial officials granted the privilege of enforcing
the constitution, but rather because they are the constitution. Conklin
insists that the legal text and the compendium of doctrinal interpretations that have been grafted upon it are the residual deposits of the
more dynamic engagement over competing images of constitutional
reality: "a constitution is an image; it is a product of the legal
community's imagination. A constitution does not live except through
the consciousness of the legal community."9
From this starting point, Conklin proceeds to describe three
constitutional images that have found expression and favour in the

8 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989). Conklin tends to talk about
"rationalism" rather than formalism, but we do not believe that this is of any great
significance in terms of our critical claims.

9 Ibid. at 3.
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Canadian legal community of scholars and judges. The first is an
historicist image. Looking to the history of institutional arrangements
as the source of constitutional norms, this image rests its claims to
validity on tradition and reaches its most potent manifestation in the
0
Martland/Ritchie dissent in Re: Resolution to Amend the Constitution.1
On the other hand, the rationalist image views the constitution as a
self-contained collection of posited rules or values. Celebrating the
rational architecture of the law's internal logic, the different versions
of this image can be found in the writings of William Lederman and
P.M. Kennedy." Finally, the teleological image derives constitutional
meaning from the ends toward which society is or ought to be moving
and receives its strongest approval in the judicial and scholarly legacy
12
of Ivan Rand.
While each of these images has had its practitioners and apologists, Conklin maintains that the rationalist image has dominated
Canadian constitutional discourse. Indeed his account and criticism of
this image is the book's intellectual heart and soul. According to
Conklin, the rationalist image is not monolithic. On the contrary, he
goes to great lengths to show that there has been a continuing tension
and variation among three distinct strains of rationalist imagery: rule
rationalism, policy rationalism and orthodox rationalism. Rule rationalism sees the constitution as a comprehensive set of rules or doctrines
that can be derived rationally from the constitutional text and from the
real or presumed intent of its framers. Born in the 1920s, it captured
the allegiance of Albert Abel, Louis-Phillippe Pigeon and Jean Beetz.13
Policy rationalism looks beyond the rules to policies or values that are
said to underlie the constitutional text. The inquiry remains rationalist
in that the policies being sought are assumed to possess an objective
identity that can be ascertained through rational inquiry: "the policy
image merely adds a broader resource material (social/economic facts
and shared goals) and more diversified techniques of rationality (psychology, theory, and history)". 14 This image was embraced by Bora
Laskin, Noel Lyon and Peter Russell. Finally, orthodox rationalism
seeks constitutional truth in the interplay between textual rules and
extrinsic policies. As expressed in the work of Brian Dickson, Bertha
Wilson and William Lederman, its aspiration is to escape the rationalist
confines of both rule rationalism and policy rationalism. Ultimately,
however, orthodox rationalists are forced to seek refuge in some form
of rationalist discourse. For Conklin, they "uncontrollably, impercep-

Ibid. at 74-81, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, (sub nom. Reference Re Amendment
of the Constitution of Canada (Nos 1, 2 and 3)) 125 D.L.R. (3d) 1.
11Conklin, supra, note 8 at 173-214.
12 Ibid. at 219-35.
13 Ibid. at 173-84.
14Ibid. at 186.
10

Ottawa Law ReviewlRevue de droit d'Ottawa

[Vol. 22:2

horizons not unlike generations of Canadian
tibly relapse into rationalist
5
them".'
before
scholars
Having rejected rationalism, Conklin throws his jurisprudential
weight behind the teleological image. He maintains that it is necessary
and realizable that constitutional law would consist of judicial efforts
to engage in reflection about the telos to which Canadian society is
evolving. However, while constitutional adjudication must involve itself
in the potentially open-ended issues of ideal-directed theory, it is
constrained by the need to situate such reflection within the historical
tradition of social/cultural practice in Canadian law and politics. In
this way, according to Conklin, constitutional law not only becomes a
dynamic mediation between political theory and legal practice, but also
ensures that it contains an appropriate dimension of self-criticism and
scrutiny: "The challenge for the contemporary lawyer is to picture a
constitution which allows him [or] her to question the 'givens', to
connect the 'givens' to universalist human rights claims of theory, and
to critique their reified character when divorced from social/cultural
practice." 16
All of this makes for interesting reading, but what does it tell us
about the Canadian Constitution and the way that it operates? How
does it advance our understanding of the practice and legitimacy of
constitutional adjudication? The answer is that it tells us far less than
Conklin would have us believe. Emboldened by the initial power of
his categorical insight, Conklin relies upon his taxonomy of constitutional images to develop a full-blown theory of constitutional decisionmaking. Unfortunately, his normative ambitions outstrip his analytical
reach. Indeed, the juxtaposition of quotes from the rationalist Plato
and the deconstructionist Derrida on the opening pages of IMAGES OF
A CONSTITUTION

create a suitable, but unintended contradictory icon

for the ensuing text. For Conklin's espousal of visionary formalism to
carry the day, he must demonstrate not only that judicial utterances
can be usefully and consistently categorized according to particular
constitutional images, but that the images judges hold drive the outcome of the cases they decide. Moreover, if his advocacy of teleological
imagery is to pass jurisprudential muster, he must be able to demonstrate that resort to such imagery has justificatory validity in a democratic polity. It is the burden of the next two sections to show that
Conklin is unable to meet these crucial challenges. Rather his constitutional vision, by losing contact with socio-political reality, becomes
little more than constitutional dreaming.

15
16

Ibid. at 216.
Ibid. at 218.
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III
While they may sometimes appear self-contained and exhaustive,
constitutional visions are never complete or mutually exclusive. They
are inevitably selective in emphasis and embrace. It is their raison
d'tre to comprise an accessible distillation of the historical and
aspirational elements of our collective and personal lives. Because of
their generality and aphoristic nature, they often lead to contradictions
between visionary intimations and existential practices and result in
incoherences among commonplace patterns of behaviour:17 the constitutional practice is not always the child of the visionary parent.
Constitutional actors are divided among and within themselves about
the appeal and efficacy of different visions of constitutional order.' 8
The courts and legal doctrine are venues for the ceaseless negotiation of visionary conflict. As there are many different visions at
work in its formulation and interpretation, even one judge's contribution to legal doctrine is not a reflected embodiment of one indwelling
and sufficient vision, but is the formal site for the attempted, but
elusive, blending and reconciliation of competing visions. The temporary accommodations made are more a result of political expediency
than moral purity. Although one vision may tend to dominate and
infuse the law with its guiding principles, competing visions will
constantly challenge it and provide a debilitating set of counterprinciples. At times, the tension will precipitate doctrinal crisis; at
other times, the friction will be subdued and less disruptive. Yet, muted
or manifest, this antagonism fuels and informs constitutional development.
Consider the example of Bora Laskin to which Conklin frequently
refers. Whereas, at times, Conklin tries to label Laskin a policy
rationalist, at other times he characterizes him as a rule rationalist.
Conklin begins by proclaiming that "Bora Laskin, as a young scholar,
gives policy rationalism a rigour and sophistication unmatched in
Canadian constitutional history."1 9 Yet, a short time later, he contends
that "[flor Laskin, the teacher, the British North America Act, 1867
posits rules and those rules constitute the exclusive resource material
for constitutional law." 20 Is Conklin trying to make a distinction
between Laskin as a "young scholar" and Laskin as a "teacher"? If
so, what accounts for the change? Which is the real Laskin? Conklin
remains suspiciously silent on these pressing questions. Of course, the

17 See M. Oakeshott, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd,
1962) at 123-25; R.M. Unger, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1986).
18 See D. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication (1976)
89 HARv. L. REv. 1685.
'9 Supra, note 8 at 7.
20 Ibid. at 41.
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reality is that Laskin, like other judges, was quite capable of cutting
his constitutional image to suit his political cloth. Thus, while Conklin
goes to great pains to contrast the rule rationalism of Justice Laskin
with the policy rationalism of Justice Dickson, it is not difficult to
find examples that run counter to this assessment. Conklin claims that:
Dickson understands constitutional judgments to be "value decision"
whereas for Laskin, the judge, values constitute an illegitimate source of

law. Dickson incorporates values and public policy as constituent elements
of his image whereas Laskin, as a 21judge, relies entirely upon posited
rules for his image of a constitution.

This assessment sits very uneasily with the well-known picketing
case of Harrisonv. Carswell.22 In that case, Justice Dickson steadfastly
maintained that it was not the role of the Court to "weigh and
determine the respective values to society of the right to property and
the right to picket" because doing so would raise "important and
difficult political and socio-economic issues, the resolution of which
must, by their very nature, be arbitrary and embody personal economic
and social beliefs". 23 On the other hand, Justice Laskin advocated that
the Court engage in a "balancing of interests" in order to further its
"search for an appropriate legal framework for new social facts which
show up the inaptness of an old doctrine developed upon a completely
different social foundation". 24 How could this be? How could Laskin,
the great rule rationalist, have so openly embraced an inquiry into
policy? And how could Dickson, one of Conklin's prime examples of
a policy rationalist, suddenly have become so rule-bound? The answer,
surely, is that the images Conklin projects onto these two judges did
not suit their political purposes in this case. For Laskin, perhaps
because of his experience with labour relations, the rule established
by the picketing law seemed oppressive and repugnant; he therefore
found it necessary to invoke policy arguments to challenge its continued
authority. For Dickson, possibly because of his corporate law background, the same rule seemed natural and desirable; he therefore had
no wish to subject it to searching scrutiny.
We do not mean to suggest that Conklin is wrong to argue that
Laskin, Dickson and other jurists have an affinity for one constitutional
image over another. On the contrary, he makes a strong case that they
do. Where he goes wrong is in assuming that these images actually
drive legal outcomes. As the judgments in Harrison v. Carswell show,
judges are quite capable of shifting images when it suits their political
purposes: constitutional images are a fungible part of a broader vision

21

Ibid. at 63.

[1976] 2 S.C.R. 200, 62 D.L.R. (3d) 68 [hereinafter cited to S.C.R.].
23 Ibid. at 218.
24 Ibid. at 209.
22
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of political justice. Such shifts, however, are rarely necessary; there is
usually sufficient scope within a judge's preferred image to fashion
whatever results he or she desires. No better evidence of constitutional
imagery's indeterminacy exists than that provided by Conklin himself.
In discussing the judicature sections of the Constitution Act, 1867,25
Conklin notes that Laskin's views shifted over time concerning the
proper interpretation to be placed upon section 96 - the section that
provides for federal appointment of superior, county and district court
judges. As an academic, Laskin viewed this section as nothing more
than an appointing power and dismissed the "needless artificiality" of
reading section 96 as preserving the judicial functions of section 96
courts. As a judge, however, Laskin embraced such "artificiality",
holding in Crevier v. A.G. Canada that it "would make a mockery" 26
of the Constitution Act, 1867 to allow provincial governments to
transfer section 96 powers to provincially appointed appeal tribunals. 27
Conklin's explanation for this shift is supremely unconvincing. It
did not occur because Laskin became disaffected with one constitutional vision and turned his judicial affections to another; it was more
than a whimsical change of judicial outfit. As Conklin concedes, both
arguments are consistent with the judge's rule rationalist image of the
constitution. Rather Conklin tells us that the shift came about because
Laskin moved from a "textualist" approach to rule rationalism to a
"functionalist" approach to rule rationalism. Notwithstanding its particular leanings and defining characteristics, rule rationalism, it seems,
can accomplish many things depending upon the approach taken to it:
its apparent indirection belies its predictive significance.
But the question remains of why Laskin moved from one approach
to another. Conklin cannot really expect us to believe that Laskin went
to sleep as a "textualist" one night and woke up as a "functionalist"
the next morning, the result, perhaps, of a nocturnal visit from some
jurisprudential fairy who sprinkled constitutional moondust in his eyes.
It is more likely that the move had less to do with the taxonomic
niceties of constitutional imagery than with the dynamic forces of
social and political power. Rather than Conklin's juristic flights of
fancy, a more plausible explanation might be that Laskin, as an
academic, identified with the interests of labour tribunals and other
administrative bodies while, as a judge, he came to care more about
the parochial concerns of the judiciary and be influenced by its special
interests. If constitutional image had anything to contribute to the
process, it was more likely a matter of Laskin's need to maintain his
judicial self-image than anything else.

25 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
26 [1981] 2 S.C.R. 220 at 237, 127 D.L.R. (3d) 1 at 13.
27 Conklin, supra, note 8 at 41-43.
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IV
The upshot of all this is that constitutional imagery is much less
important in explaining constitutional discourse and decisions than
Conklin recommends or predicts. Certainly, "the expression of a
judge's image of the constitution" is not the major source from which
"to understand a judgment as it really is". 28 Constitutional visions, on
their own, tell us very little about legal outcomes. However, this does
not mean that they are of no importance to the constitutional critic.
Their significance lies in their contribution to the essential task of
legitimacy - the effort to convince citizens that the power wielded
by the judiciary has an authority and wisdom that transcends the
collective views of its existing membership and is thereby deserving
of civil obedience. Contrary to the insistence of Conklin and other
formalists, constitutional imagery is not a source of determinative
reasons for judicial decisions, but rather a mode of rationalization that
judges and judicial apologists use to account for decisions driven by
forces largely extrinsic to constitutional discourse.
In the same way that the paparazzi who chronicle royal apparel
maintain it is the clothes that make the monarch, visionary formalists
perpetuate the myth that it is the image that makes the judge. This
shallow pretence is no more persuasive in the judicial arena than it is
in the royal realm. Presumably, it is only convincing to those dedicated
followers of fashion that have a material stake in the public's continued
hoodwinking. It is true, obviously, that some judges prefer one kind
of sartorial rationalization to others and that this inclination may bear
some connection to their deeper political predilections. Moreover, it is
worth observing that particular styles of discursive dressing may sometimes have to be changed to better produce or match a desired effect.
But, when all is said and done, clothes are clothes. And, while the
choice of apparel, literally or figuratively, may signal much, rarely
will it determine the identity and intentions of the person who is in
the clothes. It is the familiar error of, at best, mistaking symbol for
substance or, at worst, treating symbol as substance.
Nevertheless, even if Conklin's account of visionary formalism
could overcome the fatal weaknesses of incoherence and indeterminacy,
the question would still remain of why a democratic polity should be
governed by the constitutional and social visions of an elite cadre of
political officials. Mindful of the fact that, in spite of recent and
continuing efforts to pluralize it, the judiciary remains a very unrepresentative and relatively homogeneous group, Conklin offers no real
defence of the legitimacy of subjecting citizens to its partial visions of
justice. It is not a challenge to the bona fides of judges to suggest that
their largely male, white, Christian, wealthy and middle-aged identities
will influence and shape their acceptance of certain values as funda28

Ibid. at 45.
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mental verities. Like all people, judges' images of the good life tend
to reflect the limited and, in their case, privileged vantage-points from
which they survey and evaluate events. As such, judicial imagery is a
part of, not apart from, the regularly contested and always contestable
context of politics.
This points to another, but more fundamental problem with Conklin's analysis and that of visionary formalism in general. By simultaneously discussing differences in constitutional imagery and discounting underlying forces of class and power, Conklin pretends that there
is far more room for diversity and radicalism in constitutional adjudication than actually exists. Judges may be free to chose historicism,
rationalism or teleology as an imaginative mode of justificatory argument, but they cannot detach themselves from certain foundational
understandings. While the respective rights of picketers and property
owners may be modified at the margins, the underlying institutions
and distributions of property are not subject to challenge. While the
courts may occasionally voice sympathy for the plight of ordinary and
disadvantaged Canadians, they remain firmly wedded to a vision of
rights that privileges those who wield market power and restricts those
who would like to see that power restrained. Thus, despite a considerable change of personnel over the last little while, Supreme Court
of Canada decisions remain all too predictable. Changes in constitutional imagery belie a depressingly consistent devotion to a conservative vision of society and its transformative possibilities - plus ga
change, plus c'est la meme chose.
Evidence supporting this sad conclusion is to be found in the
reactionary assumptions and regressive implications of the Supreme
Court's holdings in cases such as Hunter v. Southam Inc. ,29 Retail,
Wholesale and DepartmentStore Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery
Ltd3O and Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia.31 These cases
reveal the Court's preoccupation with negative as opposed to positive
liberty, its emphasis on individual over collective interests, and its
assumption that governments represent the greatest threat to social
justice.32 Additional evidence may be found in two decisions which
the Supreme Court handed down during the summer of 1990. In these
cases, the Court further hammered down a couple more political planks
on its platform of constitutional ideology. The first decision showed
the extent of the Court's solicitude to economic power; the second

29 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 641.
30 [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, 33 D.L.R. (4th) 174.
31 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1.
32 For an extended account of these cases and their political implications, see
A. Petter, The Politics of the Charter(1986) 8 Sup. CT L. REV. 473; A.C. Hutchinson
& A. Petter, Private Rights I Public Wrongs: The Liberal Lie of the Charter (1988)
38 U.T.L.J. 278; A.C. Hutchinson & A. Petter, Paradise Postponed (1990) 1:3
CONSTITUTIONAL FORUM 8.
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demonstrated the willingness of the Court to deny constitutional recognition to the collective claims of working people. In the process, the
Court gave confirmation -

if any were needed -

that it will continue

to interpret the Constitution as a document devoted to protecting
established interests and values.
In Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario,33 the
Court confirmed its willingness to treat commercial speech as deserving
of the full rigours of constitutional protection. Although the particular
facts of the case may have seemed suitable for judicial intervention,
the wider implications of the Court's reasoning are distinctly distasteful
for those swayed by a democratic vision of social justice. The founders
of Tridont Dental Services were disciplined for advertising in contravention of the dental profession's statutory regulations against advertising. The Court had little difficulty in deciding that such a blanket
prohibition infringed the Charter'sguarantee of freedom of expression.
Moreover, it held that, while certain restrictions were permissible to
preserve professional standards, an across-the-board ban could not be
"demonstrably justified as reasonable limits in a free and democratic
society" under section 1 of the Charter.
In delivering the Court's judgment, Justice McLachlin insisted
that "advertising involves more than economics". 34 It was important
that consumers were able to make informed choices, and access to
advertising was the best way to ensure this: "[advertising] does serve
an important public interest by enhancing the ability of [consumers] to
make informed choices". 35 The difficulty with this kind of reasoning
is that it assumes that the sources of commercial speech - primarily
large economic enterprises - are best placed or motivated to provide
the information upon which informed choices can be made. Yet if
these choices are so important, why would we leave advertising to the
discretion of those who stand most to benefit from partial disclosure
and distortion of information? Whatever else it may be, commercial
advertising constitutes a concerted attempt to persuade people to add
to the profitability of business. This does not mean that such advertising
is a bad thing in itself: all societies benefit from a large quantity and
high calibre of product information. But the crucial issue is who is to
regulate and monitor such information - citizens and consumers
through legislative initiatives and regulatory agencies or the corporate
sector by means of market power? To choose the corporations is to
elevate the pursuit of profit to a constitutional status that it does not
warrant, thereby36 diminishing, rather than enhancing, the quality of
democratic life.

33

[1990] 2 S.C.R. 232, 71 D.L.R. (4th) 68 [hereinafter cited to S.C.R.].

34 Ibid. at 241.
35 Ibid. at 247.
36

See A.C. Hutchinson, Money Talk: Against Constitutionalizing(Commercial)

Speech (1990) 17 CAN. Bus. L.J. 1.
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The second decision, Professional Institute of the Public Service
of Canada v. Northwest Territories,37 concerned the. right of workers
to bargain collectively. In a factually complex case, the Supreme Court
had to decide whether the Charter's guarantee of freedom of association prevented a government from curtailing the capacity of unions to
represent their members in collective bargaining. The decision was the
seventh on labour relations under the Charter to go to the Court and
it went the way of the earlier six - a crushing defeat for workers.
Speaking for a majority of the Court, Justice Sopinka held that
"bargaining for working conditions is not, of itself, a constitutional
freedom of individuals". 38 Relying on an earlier trilogy of cases
denying a constitutional right to strike, he stated that, while the Charter
protects the right to form and belong to a union, "it does not protect
an activity solely on the ground that the activity is a foundational or
essential purpose of a [union]".39 As such, the Northwest Territories'
government refusal to give legislative recognition to a public service
union as a bargaining unit did not contravene the Charter and was
perfectly constitutional.
Sopinka's pronouncements that, in the constitutional scheme of
things, "bargaining for working conditions is not, of itself, a constitutional freedom of individuals", 40 is offensive and hardhearted, especially in contrast with the Court's concern for the speech rights of
corporate advertisers. The fact that retiring Chief Justice Dickson went
along with this verdict, albeit "reluctantly" and "not without considerable hesitation", is a sad, but perhaps revealing last word to a long
judicial career and offers a telling footnote to Conklin's. pigeonholing
Dickson as an "orthodox rationalist". 4 1 As Justice Cory on behalf of
the dissenting three judges stated, to grant a constitutional right 'to
form a union, but to deny its associating members the right to engage
in the very activity that comprises the raison d'9tre for forming the
union in the first place is to render the right of association empty and
meaningless.
The, fact that the Court, in a period of a few months, had no
difficulty upholding commercial speech rights to the benefit of corporate advertisers while denying collective bargaining rights to the detriment -of unionized workers reveals the force and direction of its
constitutional ideology. In a society that espouses democracy and
equality, one might have thought that the capacity of employees to
bargain collectively for better working conditions would be accorded
at least .the .same constitutional status as the ability of entrepreneurs to
promote their products through commercial messages. One might also
37 [1990]

2 S.C.R. 367, 72 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [hereinafter cited to S.C.R.].

Ibid. at 404.
39 Ibid. at 402.
38

40 Ibid. at 404.
41

See supra, text accompanying note 20.
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have thought that real citizens, not economic entities like corporations,
would enjoy priority to basic human rights. The Court's denial of both
of these propositions represents a stunning disregard for human values
and working people that is made no more palatable by being couched
in the reassuring rhetoric of constitutional principle.
The distinct preference of the courts for the interests of the haves
over the have-nots persists in the face of much activity in the rhetorical
salons of constitutional imagery. Doctrinal indeterminacy masks and
gives way to ideological proclivity. Rather than expose this objectionable state of affairs, academics seem content to record and quibble
over the latest trends in the judicial fashions of argumentative attire.
This is particularly galling in the work of sophisticated scholars like
Conklin. Recognizing that constitutional adjudication takes place in a
ongoing context of power relations, he pays only lip-service to this
context and makes no real attempt to comprehend the relation between42
constitutional imagery and the protocols of social and economic power.
Moreover, he fails to address the radical implication of the critical idea
that "all knowledge is socialised" - the implication that any attempt
to salvage judicial review as a formally viable and substantively
democratic enterprise is doomed to failure. 43 In the process, Conklin
has reduced the promising insights of constitutional imagery into an
escapist exercise in constitutional dreaming.
V
In contemporary debate, there is almost complete agreement that
law is neither fully beholden to socio-economic conditions nor fully
independent from them. The notion that law possesses no autonomy
or distinctiveness as a mode of thinking and acting is seldom taken
seriously. Conversely, the belief that law is an entirely autonomous
field of human activity has long been discredited. Rather than make a
futile Kelsenian attempt "to free the science of law from alien elements", the present concern is to identify the formal and substantive
connections between law and these "alien elements". Indeed, contemporary jurisprudence seems to find an elusive intellectual and political
unity in the notion that legal doctrine is "relatively autonomous" from
the political formation of social life. Unfortunately, this unity is more
apparent and superficial than real and informing. The notion of "relative autonomy" is so ample that it can accommodate almost all
theorizing about law. As such, it offers little guidance or comfort to
those seriously committed to explicating the law-and-politics conundrum. There is a vast and intellectually significant difference between
Conklin, supra, note 8 at 256-59 and 269-71.
See A.C. Hutchinson, DWELLING ON THE THRESHOLD:
MODERN LEGAL THOUGHT (Toronto: Carswell, 1988) c. 9.
42
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those scholars who maintain that law is primarily separate from society
but is partly determined by it, and those who hold that law is primarily
determined by society but is partly separate from it.
The differences between these positions are much more than
matters of emphasis and degree. Nevertheless, most of the scholarly
antagonists share enough to become ensnared in the same two traps.
The first is approaching law and politics as though they were separate
entities whose relations need to be explicated. This approach fails to
recognize that law and politics, by interacting and combining in
manifold and mutually-generative ways, comprise inseparable parts of
the same whole. 4 Law is not only a political artifact of the first-order,
it is also a primary artificer of its political context. This does not mean
that law and politics, because they are fully implicated in one another,
replicate each other in a simple or undistorted fashion: the life of the
law is much more than its internal logic, yet something less than the
totality of political experience. However it does mean that there is no
form of social life "out there" independent of the law which constitutes
and structures it. Nor is there any law "out there" independent of the
society that generates and defines itself through the law. The world to
which law applies is already thoroughly informed and constituted by
the forms and structures of law.
The second trap is thinking that it is necessary to provide an
account of the law-and-politics relation that can claim some general or
universal validity. There will always be an inseparable and organic
relation between law and politics, but no one account of that relation
will be valid for all times and all societies. While it is possible and
desirable to provide historically or socially specific explanations of
legal and social change, it would be a mistake to try to extrapolate
from these insights universal statements about law in general. 45 For
instance, a convincing account of the role played by law in advanced
capitalist societies may have only limited application to pre-industrial
or customary societies. Any kind of static, unified or instrumentalist
account of the relation between law and politics, whether it comes
from the right, left or centre of the political spectrum, is unconvincing.
The relation between law and social conditions is indeterminate and
indeterminately so. Like law and society itself, their relationship is
contingent and its precise nature will vary with the context. The socioeconomic context is itself largely indeterminate and requires no particular legal rule for its continued survival.
While a shift in the whole regime of legal rules (for example,
contract and property) will be significant, the existence or shading of
particular rules (for example, the postal rules and the finders' rules)

- See, e.g., G.E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law (1984)

97 HARV. L. REV. 1276.
45 See, e.g., M. Barrett, WOMEN'S OPPRESSION TODAY (London: Verso, 1980)
at 251-53.
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will not be crucial. Moreover, in the same way that the socio-economic
context under-determines law, that very same law over-determines the
possible outcomes to any legal dispute. It is possible and desirable to
offer sensible explanations of doctrinally discrete and historically specific regions of legal and social change, 46 but scholars should resist

the temptation to go further. It is mistaken to extrapolate from those
findings to more universalizable statements about law in general at
different times and in different places. As traditional Kuhnian wisdom
reveals, any account (including, of course, this one) is as dependent
upon historical circumstances and social context as the phenomena it
seeks to explain. Thus the extent to which law is determined by, and
a determinate of social conditions is itself contingent. Indeed, the
acknowledgement of indeterminacy is an ineradicable and pervasive
feature of knowledge about ourselves, our situation and our theorizing
about them.
Our own' understanding of the law-and-politics relation can best
be expressed in the imaginative terms of a sheepish metaphor: the
relation between society at large and law is like the "inseparable
closeness" between sheep farming and woollen sweaters. 47 This understanding exhibits both differences and similarities with the views of
traditional theorists. Our view differs from instrumentalists' in that it
recognizes that the law can be more than a sheepskin: the relation is
more than one-dimensional,. deterministic and unidirectional. At. the
same time, it is similar in that it concedes that law is significantly
constrained by the dominant mode of social organization. On the other
hand, our view is different to the idealists in that it does not think
that law can stand apart from social life. But it is similar in that it
sees a more multi-linear relation between law and its social-economic
milieu. In short, the relation is both more complex and more indeterminate. The legal products woven are constrained by and take on
meaning in the larger socio-economic circumstances. The precise relation will be contingent and depend upon the historical and social
details of 'the particular situation. The law may be more than a
sheepskin, but it is never more than the product of the sheep.
CONCLUSION

More than most countries, North America is a land of dreams. It
exists as much in the gazetteer of the ideological imagination as in the
atlas of political reality. No matter how often old dreams die, new
dreams spring up in their place. The human capacity to dream is

46 See, e.g., E. Tucker, ADMINISTERING DANGER IN THE WORKPLACE: THE
LAW AND POLITICS OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION IN ON-

TARiO, 1850-1914 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990).
-.

Schauer, Lawyers and Lawmaking (1985) 83 MICH. L. REv. 1141.
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irrepressible. And this is no bad thing. Once people lose the will to
dream, they succumb too easily to an abject fatalism in which they
see their lot as one to be endured rather than improved. But, while
giving up on dreaming entirely is to submit to despair, to live entirely
in a world of dreams is to mistake fantasy for reality. This is the
dubious achievement of Conklin and those tempted by the rhetorical
appeal of a visionary formalism.
Like the law itself, modes of thinking about law have their limits
and orientations. As special kinds of social knowledge, explanations
are contingent and open to constant interpretation and reinterpretation.
There is no world of reality that stands apart from the way in which
the world is described or judged. Nor is there a way of describing or
judging that exists outside the world. Reality and the medium in which
it is understood and evaluated are inextricable. Rightness is not about
correspondence with an external world nor a solipsistic harmony with
our own prejudices. It is to be found in the historical and reflective
negotiation between the two.
In this important sense, law is always and inescapably political.
While this insight carries profoundly disturbing implications for the
mainstream legal theorists and their conceptions of law, it also means
that radical theorists must take seriously the possibility of law as a
formative constituent of social life and a transformative instrument of
political struggle. This does not mean that social activists should rush
like lemmings into the courts or mindlessly embrace the "Rule of
Law"; such responses are more suited to the born-again legal zealot
than the progressive skeptic. A transformative approach to law entails
much more than pouring new legal wine into old institutional bottles.
It requires a critical understanding of the political nature of legal
structures, the limitations of the instrumental impact operation and
their capacity to accommodate change. For this reason, a constitutive
theory of law, founded upon an understanding of historical and political
contingency, can be conducive to the progressive use of law while
guarding against "the slide into reformism or cynicism".48 Visionary
imaginings must interact with and be framed by concrete realities to
create a politically effective form of legal practice. Then, and only
then, can engagement with law begin to influence the substance of our
existence, contributing to a social life in which people are less alien
to their better selves and more able to shape their collective destinies.
Visionary formalism is not the answer.
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K. Kare, Law-Making as Praxis (1979) 40 TELOS 135.

